남의 취향을 눈으로 배우고, 나의 취향을 머리로 찾은 다음에, 그 취향을 경험으로 확정하는 거군요.
– 그런데, 경험은 주어진 가설을 지지하는 방향으로 해석됩니다. 즉, 광고를 가설로 먼저 접한 뒤에 제품을 경험하면, 광고에 맞게 경험을 해석합니다. 최근 많은 팝업스토어가 열리는 이유도, 회사의 가설에 맞추어 방문객이 경험을 해석하기를 기대하는 것이라고 볼 수 있습니다.
This paper examines the influence of advertising on how and what consumers learn from product experience. A hypothesis-testing framework is adopted where consumers treat advertisements as tentative hypotheses that can be tested through product experience. Two experiments were conducted using product categories that provided either ambiguous or unambiguous evidence about product quality. The first experiment showed that when consumers have access to unambiguous evidence, judgments of product quality are dependent only on the objective physical evidence and unaffected by advertising. However, advertising had dramatic effects on perceptions of quality when consumers saw ambiguous evidence; judgments and product inspection behavior protocols showed that advertising induced consumers to engage in confirmatory hypothesis testing and search. The second experiment showed that advertising influenced quality judgments by affecting the encoding of the physical evidence; retrieval of ad-consistent evidence also appeared to occur, though to a lesser degree.
– 만약 신맛이 나는 커피를 좋아하고, 신맛이 나는 커피를 왜 좋아하는지 말할 수 있다면, 취향이 정교화되었다라고 말할 수 있습니다. 즉 취향이 정교화되면 무엇을 좋아하는지, 왜 좋아하는지, 두 가지를 말할 수 있게 됩니다.
어릴 적에 거실에 깔려져있던 카페트를 보면서 “뭐 이렇게 복잡한 그림을 그려놓았나” 생각했는데 관심을 갖게 되면 달라보이는군요.
– 카페트뿐만 아니라, 안경, 신발, 넥타이 등 세상의 모든 제품과 서비스에 관심을 갖기 시작하면, 취향을 가진 사람과 그렇지 않은 사람 사이의 차이가 확연하게 드러납니다. 특히 최근에는 사람들이 자신의 취향을 찾아가는 걸 너무 재미있어해요. 대학생들이 스스로의 취향을 정교화하기 위해서 운동화, 향수, 음악에 많은 비용을 쓰는 것처럼, 소비자들이 찾아와서 스스로의 취향을 찾는 놀이터가 다른 제품에서도 만들어질 것 같습니다.
Consumers’ understanding of their own preferences can be aided by a “consumption vocabulary”-a taxonomy or framework that facilitates identifying the relation between a product’s features and one’s evaluation of the product. In the absence of such a vocabulary, consumers’ understanding of their own preferences will require more extensive experience and may never fully develop. The effect of such a vocabulary is tested in two experiments in which subjects provided with a vocabulary (1) exhibit better-defined and more consistent preferences than control subjects, (2) show improved cue discovery, and (3) show learning (i.e., increases in consistency over time). All results hold regardless of the functional form of the model used to assess subjects’ preference formation.
처음에는 따라하기로 시작하는 거네요. 그런데 남의 걸 보고 배우는게 나만의 온전한 취향이 될 수 있을까요?
– 사람들은 취향에 대해서 이중적인 생각을 갖고 있습니다. 처음에는 다른 사람들을 막 쫓아가지만, 나중에는 모든 사람들이 가는 곳에는 가고 싶어하지 않습니다. 결국, 대중을 따라가지 않고 나만의 독특한 취향을 찾아보고 싶다는 생각이 듭니다. 이 때, 취향이 개발된 전문가를 찾게 되고 책을 읽거나 전문가 모임을 찾게 됩니다.
People often diverge from members of other social groups: They select cultural tastes (e.g., possessions, attitudes, or behaviors) that distinguish them from outsiders and abandon tastes when outsiders adopt them. But while divergence is pervasive, most research on the propagation of culture is based on conformity. Consequently, it is less useful in explaining why people might abandon tastes when others adopt them. The 7 studies described in this article showed that people diverge to avoid signaling undesired identities. A field study, for example, found that undergraduates stopped wearing a particular wristband when members of the “geeky” academically focused dormitory next door started wearing them. Consistent with an identity-signaling perspective, the studies further showed that people often diverge from dissimilar outgroups to avoid the costs of misidentification. Implications for social influence, identity signaling, and the popularity and diffusion of culture are discussed.
Members of the Target Dorm viewed the members of the Academic Dorm as dissimilar, but would they abandon a previously held taste when the geeks adopted it? Results suggested that they did; in the week after the wristbands were adopted by the geeks, there was a 32% drop in the number of Target Dorm members who reported wearing the wristband. This drop was not accounted for by simple boredom. During the same period of time, there was only a 6% drop in wristband wearing in the control condition, X2(1, N=36)=3.78, p=.05.
– 초기에 경험이 부족해서 열쇠를 잘 열지 못할 때에는, 잠긴 열쇠를 열어달라는 요청에 30분동안 끙끙거려서 문을 열어주면 지켜보던 집주인이 고생했다면서 수고비와 팁을 주었습니다. 그런데 경험이 많이 쌓인 후에는, 잠긴 열쇠를 금방 열어주면 지켜보던 집주인이 팁도 주지 않고 수고비도 적게 주려고 합니다.
– 노력 휴리스틱은 벗어나기 어렵고, 특히 한국에서 강하게 작동합니다. 결과가 얼마나 좋은가 만큼이나 과정상 얼마나 노력했는가를 중요하게 생각하는 것인데, 문제는 과정상의 노력이 눈에 보여야 한다는 점입니다. 재택근무를 하거나 업무를 효율적으로 마무리 짓고 일찍 퇴근하면 눈에 보이는 노력이 부족해서 나쁘게 평가를 받고, 똑같은 시간을 일해도 아침 일찍 나와서 하는 대신 저녁 늦게까지 남아 있으면 노력하는 모습이 보여서 평가를 좋게 받습니다.
Kruger, J., Wirtz, D., Van Boven, L., & Altermatt, T. W. (2004). The effort heuristic. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(1), 91–98.
The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.
뭔가 많이 알고 있는 사람, 학식이 높은 사람, 전문 지식이 많은 사람이 지식의 저주에 빠지는 경우가 많겠네요.
– 지식이 깊어지면 지식을 모르는 상태가 어떤지 상상하기 어렵다는 개념은 굉장히 흥미로워요. 왜냐하면 일반적으로 지식이 많아지는 건 좋은 일인데, 잘 모르는 사람과 의사소통 할 때에는 나쁜 일이 됩니다. 학생을 가르치는 교수나 직원과 일하는 기업의 임원이 지식의 저주에 빠지기 쉽습니다.
– 한 기업의 직원분이 흥미로운 사례를 알려주셨어요. 사장님 보고 자료를 만들 때, 팀장님이 ‘수묵화’ 풍으로 만들어 달라고 하셨답니다. 자료가 수묵화풍이라는 게 색감인지 의미인지, 색감이면 흑백인지 여백의 미인지, 의미라면 큰 그림 속에 디테일을 의미하는 건지… 설명해주지 않으셨다고 합니다.
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the “curse of knowledge.” Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed.
… In a clever study, economists wanted to find out whether students really learn more from experts. They collected data on every freshman at Northwestern University from 2001 to 2008. They investigated whether freshmen did better in their second course in a subject if their introductory class was taught by more qualified instructors.
You might assume that students would be better off learning the basics from an expert (a tenure‑track or tenured professor) than a nonexpert (a lecturer with less specialized knowledge). But the data showed the opposite: students who took their initial class with an expert ended up with poorer grades in the next class.
The pattern was robust across fields: students learned less from introductory classes taught by experts in every subject. It held across years—with over 15,000 students—and in courses with tougher as well as easier grading. And the experts were especially bad at teaching students who were less academically prepared.
It turns out that if you’re taking a new road, the best experts are often the worst guides. There are at least two reasons why experts struggle to give good directions to beginners. One is the distance they’ve traveled—they’ve come too far to remember what it’s like being in your shoes. It’s called the curse of knowledge: the more you know, the harder it is for you to fathom what it’s like to not know. As cognitive scientist Sian Beilock summarizes it, “As you get better and better at what you do, your ability to communicate your understanding or to help others learn that skill often gets worse and worse.” …
… It’s often said that those who can’t do, teach. It would be more accurate to say that those who can do, can’t teach the basics. A great deal of expert knowledge is tacit—it’s implicit, not explicit. The further you progress toward mastery, the less conscious awareness you often have of the fundamentals. Experiments show that skilled golfers and wine aficionados have a hard time describing their putting and tasting techniques—even asking them to explain their approaches is enough to interfere with their performance, so they often stay on autopilot. When I first saw an elite diver do four and a half somersaults, I asked how he managed to spin so fast. His answer: “Just go up in a ball.” Experts often have an intuitive understanding of a route, but they struggle to articulate all the steps to take. Their brain dump is partially filled with garbage….
This research investigates a particular type of preference reversal (PR), existing between joint evaluation, where two stimulus options are evaluated side by side simultaneously, and separate evaluation, where these options are evaluated separately. I first examine how this PR differs from other types of PRs and review studies demonstrating this PR. I then propose an explanation, called the evaluability hypothesis,and report experiments that tested this hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, PRs between joint and separate evaluations occur because one of the attributes involved in the options is hard to evaluate independently and another attribute is relatively easy to evaluate independently. I conclude by discussing prescriptive implications of this research.
2020년 코로나 이후 군대에 가려는 미국 사람이 급격하게 감소했습니다. 미군은 더 많은 모병을 위해, 최대 5만 달러의 특별 상여금을 지급하거나, 특정 기술을 보유한 신병이 6년 복무를 계약할 경우 수급 자격을 주는 혜택을 내놓았습니다. 하지만 경제적인 유인책이 큰 효과를 가져오지 못했습니다. 대신, 모집 인원을 늘리는 답은 영화에 있었습니다…
이 사례는 공감격차 (hot-cold empathy gap) 이론을 설명해줍니다. 인간은일반적으로 (차갑고) 이성적이지만, 경험하는 순간에는 (뜨겁고) 동물이 됩니다. 즉, 무언가 경험하는 순간에는, 거부할 수 없는 내장에서 올라오는 요소 (visceral state) 에 지배당합니다. 이러한 요소에는 고통, 성적 충동, 목마름, 배고픔, 졸림, 호기심, 부끄러움, 두려움, 화남 등이 포함됩니다…
Understanding discrepancies between behavior and perceived self-interest has been one of the major, but largely untackled, theoretical challenges confronting decision theory from its infancy to the present. People often act against their self-interest in full knowledge that they are doing so; they experience a feeling of being “out of control.” This paper attributes this phenomenon to the operation of “visceral factors,” which include drive states such as hunger, thirst and sexual desire, moods and emotions, physical pain, and craving for a drug one is addicted to. The defining characteristics of visceral factors are, first, a direct hedonic impact (which is usually negative), and second, an effect on the relative desirability of different goods and actions. The largely aversive experience of hunger, for example, affects the desirability of eating, but also of other activities such as sex. Likewise, fear and pain are both aversive, and both increase the desirability of withdrawal behaviors. The visceral factor perspective has two central premises: First, immediately experienced visceral factors have a disproportionate effect on behavior and tend to “crowd out” virtually all goals other than that of mitigating the visceral factor. Second, people underweigh, or even ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other people. The paper details these two assumptions, then shows how they can help to explain a wide range of phenomena: impulsivity and self-control, drug addiction, various anomalies concerning sexual behavior, the effect of vividness on decision making, and certain phenomena relating to motivation and action.
“네, 선풍기를 오래 쐬면 머리가 아파서 여러 브랜드와 여러 가격대의 선풍기를 테스트 하고 있었는데, 자연풍을 경험하게 해준다는 선풍기를 발견했어요. 가격이 55만원으로 스탠드형 선풍기 평균 가격보다 10배 가까이 비쌌습니다. 주변 사람들은 실외기가 포함된 에어컨이 50만원인데 선풍기 회사에서 사기를 친거 아니냐고 말했지만, 저는 머리가 아프지 않은 바람을 경험한다면 55만원은 투자할 수 있다고 생각했어요.”
The durability bias, the tendency to overpredict the duration of affective reactions to future events, may be due in part to focalism, whereby people focus too much on the event in question and not enough on the consequences of other future events. If so, asking people to think about other future activities should reduce the durability bias. In Studies 1–3, college football fans were less likely to overpredict how long the outcome of a football game would influence their happiness if they first thought about how much time they would spend on other future activities. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out alternative explanations and found evidence for a distraction interpretation, that people who think about future events moderate their forecasts because they believe that these events will reduce thinking about the focal event. The authors discuss the implications of focalism for other literatures, such as the planning fallacy.
Large samples of students in the Midwest and in Southern California rated satisfaction with life overall as well as with various aspects of life, for either themselves or someone similar to themselves in one of the two regions. Self-reported overall life satisfaction was the same in both regions, but participants who rated a similar other expected Californians to be more satisfied than Midwesterners. Climate-related aspects were rated as more important for someone living in another region than for someone in one’s own region. Mediation analyses showed that satisfaction with climate and with cultural opportunities accounted for the higher overall life satisfaction predicted for Californians. Judgments of life satisfaction in a different location are susceptible to a focusing illusion: Easily observed and distinctive differences between locations are given more weight in such judgments than they will have in reality.
